Queer perspectives have typically emerged from sexual minorities as a way of repudiating flawed views of sexuality, mischaracterized relationships, and objectionable social treatment of people with atypical sexuality or gender expression. In this vein, one commentator offers a queer critique of the conceptualization of children in regard to their value for people's identities and relationships. According to this account, children are morally problematic given the values that make them desirable, their displacement of other beings and things entitled to moral protection, not to mention the damaging environmental effects that follow in the wake of population growth.
| I NTR OD U CTI ON
Cristina Richie advocates queering the field of bioethics as a way of improving current understandings of identity and moral responsibilities, not to mention reframing the ambitions of bioethics itself. She also undervalues the nature and meaning of barriers that obstruct
LGBT people having children. If social values must be reconfigured for moral reasons bearing on the environment, it is unclear that LGBT people have any more responsibility in this regard than anyone else. That conclusion has all the more force if we decline to accept an interpretation of non-living things as having moral priority over the interests of human beings and other sentient creatures.
| QU EE RI N G B I OETH I CS
Commentators characterize "queer" perspectives in various ways, but almost always as a corrective to certain sociosexual orthodoxies of one kind or another. 3 For her part, Richie characterizes 'queer' as -among other things -a political stance which challenges liberal values which are said to be: production, conformity, sameness, and homogenization.
Richie deploys "queer" as a critique of normativity, by which she means the reigning "figment of what a person should be/is," in all the metaphysical and moral implications of that identity. More ambitiously expressed, she says that queerness means that "normativity of all kinds is critiqued, rejected, and abandoned." She characterizes "queerness" in contradistinction not only to heternormativity outright -in its domineering views of relationships as structured around a certain kind of opposite-sex relationship -but also in regard to the heternormativity she says has colonized the self-understanding of LGBT people. As she sees matters, then, queer bioethics is a kind of oppositional defiance, without a priori commitments to any particular normativity and/or social categories. She says, for example, that queer bioethics "is a field that fundamentally opposes categorizations, favoring pastiche to principle". In effect, she represents "queer" as skeptical thought itself, a view from nowhere, as it were, and therefore exempt from certain expectations of consistency. LGBT people and the work ahead in Bioethics. Bioethics 29, ii-v. judgment about whether individual gay men, lesbian, bisexual people, or trans people ought to have children or whether they ought to do so as a class, but I have worked to show that there are no meaningful moral obstacles to their doing so in the context of relationships and identities that may differ from social expectations.
All things considered, I have been no friend to the formal teachings of Catholicism. Perhaps the rationale for Riche's claim about my work is the idea that any moral argument that favors the having of children in one way or another amounts to the 'pronatalism' expressed by theorists of Catholicism. If so, the label doesn't' mean very much descriptively and amounts to almost nothing as a critique. At this point, however, let me take up directly the question of whether the interest in having children can survive Richie's critique, especially for LGBT people.
| TH E M E A NI N G O F CH I L DR EN
Central to Richie's analysis is the repudiation of children as fundaments in the value of human life. She declares that they have a warping effect on identities and relationships, deflect attention from the present to the future, and that they undercut an ethic of bionatural ecology.
"Don't think of the children!" might be her rallying cry. In fact, nowhere in her analyses does she characterize children as having value of any kind.
19 She does say: "While certainly reproduction can be a significant part of some people's lives, Queer bioethics offers a competing discourse to the one that assumes reproduction is a focal part of a per- 
| THE S TA TU S OF LGB T P E OP LE
Let me say a bit more here about children in relation to LGBT people.
Some
LGBT people have children through conception in opposite-sex relationships, through adoption, through foster care, or through ARTs.
It is an understatement to say that they have done so without endorsement from any major social authority. It is also an understatement to say that they have done so in sometimes inventive ways, compared to cultural expectations. 22 This is not either the place for a full-fledged defense of the right of LGBT people to have children, but I think it is more than fair to say that LGBT people have faced socially chosen obstacles without parallel for others, and -I submit -for no good moral reason. If I may put an only slightly provocatively spin on Richie's account: any obstacles in the way of LGBT people having children have ironically protected them from the parent trap! That is, those obstacles to having children have protected many LGBT people from succumbing to heteronormative reproduction. Seen from this perspective, LGBT people are maybe now worse off than before in relation to heteronormativity, because many more now live in societies giving them more opportunities -and hence more pressure -to have children, whereas they would have in the past been "protected" from this morally compromised opportunity. To be sure, the obstacles to parenthood by LGBT people are diminishing in force in significant swaths of the world, though not all.
For example, prominent medical organizations have defended the entitlement of gay, lesbian, and transmen and women to ARTs. 23 Whether that right is fully observed in practice is a different question, of course, but these professional organizations have asserted the status equality of gay, lesbian, and transpeople in regard to access and equity in such treatments. 24 For her part, Richie is unconcerned about matters of access and equity in regard to children. On the contrary, she objects almost on principle to the place of children in the aspirations of LGBT people, at least insofar as they ought to be the front line of queer interests. Not only does she see LGBT people as colonized by heteronormativity in regard to children -which effect she calls "homonormativity"-she has also offered policy recommendations that would obstruct
LGBT access to ARTs and other healthcare interventions.
For example, Richie has argued against government and insurance subsidy for ARTs for same-sex couples. 25 She justifies this exclusion by arguing that healthcare ought to confine itself to the treatment of disorders properly speaking, and two men or two women wanting to have a child suffer no pathology that obstructs conception and/or gestation of a child. This kind of argument has intellectual precedents in, for example, Leon Kass's strict interpretation of medicine as focused on "health", but the argument is vulnerable to criticism especially from the countervailing view that healthcare may legitimately aim at "well-being" in an expansive sense and not just "health" in some restrictive sense alone.
26
From this view, ARTs contribute to the well-being of same-sex couples even if they do not involve treating an underlying disease or disorder.
Even apart from this flimsy account of eligibility for fertility interventions, Richie's justification for turning away subsidized ARTs for gay and lesbian people is curiously an adverse preference, something chosen because a better option is not available. 27 She raises it only after dismissing another option, one that would have affected opposite-sex and same-sex couples equally. She says that "while a moratorium on all ARTs would be the most ecologically sound decision . . . it is unlikely that established fertility procedures or treatments would be effectively class must be theorized as 'liberated' from interest in children as part of their environmental responsibilities and why LGBT people should have any more responsibilities toward the environment than anyone else.
Gay 'theorists' such as Lee Edelman -whom Richie invokes -may interpret children as utterly beside the point of queer life, but that view is itself an interpretation, a normative "figment" of what a person is or ought to be. 29 It's not even clear that the specific proposals put forward by Richie would make much difference in regard to the protection of the environment, namely withdrawing government and insurance subsidy from same-sex couples looking for help having children via ARTS and/or shutting down body modifications for transpeople. In general, it makes sense to put solutions where the problems are, and these proposals don't do that. What is altogether lacking in Richie's analysis is any mechanism for allocating responsibility for environmental threats according to some metric of responsibility and a mechanism for prioritizing one constraint on environmental damage over another.
Without methods for establishing this kind of responsibility and priorities, the choices Richie champions are not only unprincipled, they are almost random, not to mention punitive to LGBT people. To Richie's dismay, bioethics has pretty much only ever worked to enlarge the prospects for adults having children.
| CON CLU S I ON S
LGBT people have benefited from that effort with a degree of success almost without parallel in the field. Robust defenses of LGBT people as parents, their entitlement to existing ARTs, and entitlement to techniques of assisted reproduction looming on the horizon are the rule in bioethics; opinion to the contrary is no more prevalent than it is convincing. 30 Richie wants to intervene against the enthusiasm for ever-expanding options for having children, but this intervention undoes some of the gains most important to men who have sexual interest in men, women who have sexual interest in women, people whose gender expression hits social tripwires, and people whose polyvalent sexual and romantic identities do not map easily onto socially authorized roles. Accordingly,
LGBT people become a casuality of Richie's bionaturalism. If we take seriously her principled opposition to normativities "of any kind".
LGBT identities have no special status, any more than do heteronormative "figments" of what it is to be a person, especially in relation to children.
In the face of looming environmental disaster, we are only -all of us - Emphasis added. Richie, op. cit. note 1, p. 371. Richie counts herself among those who "prefer extinction to a carbon legacy." Just to be clear: her phrase "carbon legacy" stands in for children. Richie is free, of course, to invoke the language she wishes to characterize her choice against having children as her "extinction", but except as a poetical indulgence "extinction" is a poor term to refer to the death of a childless person. I would myself find it very entertaining to read an obituary that said something like this: "Samantha Jones went extinct on June 1, 2016, leaving no carbon legacies behind." As a matter of standard usage, "extinction" refers to the death of a class of beings in kind. Only if she were the last human being alive would anyone's death constitute extinction properly speaking. to all, she opts to defend certain choke points against more people coming into existence: denying government and insurance support for fertility medicine for same-sex couples, leaving synthetic gametes unstudied in the laboratory, and possibly limiting interventions such as uterus transplants that could confer certain procreative powers on transmen and women.
Taken together, these recommendations would do very little to stem the overall tide of population growth, because of the fractional numbers of people involved. Even if the numbers were more significant, it is still not clear why LGBT people should be required to assume any responsibility for the future not equally shared by all other parties.
All things considered, one might make exactly the contrary case: that
LGBT people ought to have priority on any list of people entitled to have children, even if there were a diminution in the morally allowable number of children in the future. In view of the cultural, religious, moral, and legal obstacles that impede LGBT people having children one can imagine such an argument -on the grounds of compensatory justice -that LGBT people ought to have some priority over others in having children, should there ever be a general rationing mechanism.
At the very least, this question would have to be answered: Why should people who -as a class -have never faced socially imposed obstacles to having children be presumed entitled to first consideration for children ahead of people who -as a class -have faced socially imposed and morally unjustifiable obstacles to having children?
Richie points to queer bioethics as a way to elevate bioethics to its full potential as an instrument of critique and evaluation. That is, queer bioethics is not just a subdomain of bioethics focused on a particular group of people. Queer bioethics is or ought to be bioethics itself, by exhibiting a thorough-going Cartesian skepticism toward all received knowledge and its instruments. In this exposition of queer bioethics, the interests of LGBT people in having children come under frontal assault on the grounds that they are unnecessary to a good life, that they are desirable only in morally compromised ways, and that they do morally significant environmental damage. This queering of bioethics is of little help to LGBT people because it treats the value of LGBT lives at a deep discount in matters of access and equity. It is, sad to say, in many ways homologous with commentary that intentionally works against status equality for LGBT people. 
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